Securing the Connected World: IoT Cybersecurity Challenges and Policy Priorities for 2025

Securing the Connected World: IoT Cybersecurity Challenges and Policy Priorities for 2025

The Internet of Things is no longer a fringe technology. Sensors, cameras, medical devices, industrial controllers, smart meters, and connected vehicles are now integral to how we live, work, and defend our nations. IoT promises enormous economic and social benefits—greater efficiency, new services, improved public safety—but it also vastly expands the attack surface for cyber adversaries. That tension between promise and peril is the defining cybersecurity challenge of 2025.

The scale helps explain the urgency. Recent industry estimates put the installed base of connected IoT devices in the late teens of billions today. IoT Analytics and several market trackers place the number of connected devices near 18–19 billion in 2024–2025, with rapid growth continuing through the decade. Transforma Insights forecasts that the installed base could exceed 40 billion by 2034 as adoption expands across sectors. Those billions of devices mean billions of new endpoints to inventory, secure, patch, and manage. IoT Analytics

If scale is the macro problem, insecure design is the micro problem. Device manufacturers too often optimize cost, time-to-market, and functionality over security. The result is a systemic “insecurity-by-design” phenomenon: default passwords, unencrypted telemetry, hard-coded keys, and limited ability to update firmware remotely.Forescout’s recent analysis documents a surge in device vulnerabilities across IT, IoT, OT and medical IoT, highlighting that many widely deployed device types now present unacceptable risk for enterprises and critical infrastructure. Industrial Cyber

Threats are already turning into incidents. Operational technology (OT) and IoT-targeted campaigns have become a persistent trend in 2025: attackers increasingly use simple, automated scans to find exposed devices, then exploit decades-old vulnerabilities that remain unpatched. Nozomi Networks and other OT/IoT analysts report rising ransomware and targeted OT attacks that leverage compromised IoT devices as pivot points into larger enterprise or industrial networks. Hardware and network flaws are spiking, and penetration testing and offensive security exercises are rapidly becoming essential tools for defenders. Nozomi Networks

From my previous writings on IoT I’ve repeatedly emphasized three interlocking truths that still hold: first, IoT devices are frequently deployed into operational environments with long lifecycles but short manufacturer support windows; second, the IoT supply chain is complex and opaque—components, firmware, and third-party libraries flow into devices with little assurance; and third, the human and organizational dimensions (procurement choices, asset inventories, and change control) are often the weakest link. These realities mean that technical fixes alone will not solve the problem. Policy, procurement practices, and market incentives must change.

What should that change look like? Below are practical, prioritized recommendations that combine engineering best practices and policy levers.

Technical and operational priorities

Inventory and segmentation as a foundation. Every organization should know what IoT and OT devices are connected on its networks, where they connect, and what privileges they possess. From there, network segmentation (logical micro-segmentation for IoT/OT zones), strong identity for devices, and strict access controls reduce lateral movement and blast radius when a device is compromised. Continuous device discovery and asset management systems are essential.

Security by design and secure update capability. Device manufacturers must adopt secure development lifecycles, including threat modeling, code signing, secure boot, and built-in, verifiable over-the-air update mechanisms. Devices that cannot be patched securely should not be deployed in critical systems.

Move from perimeter to identity and behavior-based defense. Signature-based sensors are inadequate against polymorphic or zero-day exploits affecting IoT. Behavioral analytics and anomaly detection that focus on device behavior—rather than static signatures—are necessary to catch novel attacks.

Immutable backups and resilient operational plans. For industrial and medical environments, contingency plans that assume device compromise—ability to failover to safe, manual modes, maintain critical services, and recover quickly—are non-negotiable.

Supply-chain vetting and firmware provenance. Organizations must demand transparency in the supply chain: attestations about components, provenance of firmware, SBOMs (software bill of materials), and standardized vulnerability disclosure processes. Standards like SBOMs should be contractual requirements for critical deployments.

Policy and market levers

Minimum baseline security standards and labeling. Governments should require IoT devices sold into critical infrastructure and consumer markets to meet baseline security requirements—unique device credentials out of the box, secure update ability, vulnerability disclosure contact, and reasonable support windows. A product security “label” would empower procurement teams and consumers to choose safer devices.

Public-private threat sharing and sector playbooks. The pace of IoT exploits requires rapid, automated threat intelligence exchange between vendors, operators, and government CERTs. Sector-specific playbooks (healthcare IoMT, energy, transportation) that translate indicators into operational actions reduce response time and cascade risk.

Procurement and liability reform. Governments and large buyers should favor secure devices in procurement, penalize vendors who ship insecure products, and require long-term support contracts. Consideration should be given to legal frameworks that hold manufacturers accountable when negligence in security by design causes supply-side systemic risk.

Incentivize secure manufacturing and certification. Subsidies, tax credits, or accelerated procurement preferences for manufacturers that invest in secure design, reproducible supply chains, and third-party certification can shift market incentives. Public investment in testbeds and interoperability labs also helps accelerate secure innovation.

Workforce development. Expanding the talent pipeline for OT/IoT security—through apprenticeships, university programs, and industry certifications—must be a national priority. Many organizations lack staff who understand both industrial control systems and modern cyber defenses.

International and cross-sector cooperation

IoT is global and so must the response be. Devices built or sold across borders mean vulnerabilities and exploits have transnational effects. My published work urging global frameworks and norms for cybersecurity applies equally to IoT: international standards bodies, information-sharing agreements, and harmonized certification can reduce weak-link failures, especially for devices embedded in critical infrastructure and supply chains. Coordination with allies to raise the global bar for secure device production is a strategic priority. (See my prior writings on global cybersecurity frameworks.) RCR Wireless News

Closing thoughts

IoT is transforming economies and societies. But without deliberate investment in security—technical, organizational, and policy—the same connectivity that creates value will become a vector for systemic failure. The choices we make now about standards, procurement, and international cooperation will determine whether IoT becomes a foundation of resilient services or a sprawling vulnerability exploited by adversaries. The work ahead is hard but achievable: combine secure engineering, smarter procurement, stronger international norms, and a workforce ready for the hybrid world where physical systems meet software. That is how we secure the connected world in 2025 and beyond.

About the author

This article was written by Chuck Brooks